

Jacques Maritain: an anthropological basis for the civil economy tradition

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ABSTRACT

It is common among scholars who study Italian civil tradition the idea that French Personalism contains the anthropological basis in which best fits the civil economy. However, even though this idea is often repeated, it is not easy to find papers who demonstrate it clearly. Even more, it is not easy to find papers that contain -in a rigorous and systematic way- the anthropological basis for all subsequent developments of the civil economy. In this paper we take into account the works of one of the most important French personalists: Jacques Maritain. Thus, we provide a detailed description of Maritain's social anthropology, and make a close comparison between his proposals and those of the civil tradition, to conclude that the work of this philosopher can be offered as a strong anthropological basis for this tradition.

Key-words: civil economy, Maritain, personalism, anthropology

1. INTRODUCTION

In a great part of the specialized literature on civil economy it is often said that the anthropological basis of this tradition has to do with the twentieth century French personalism of Mounier and Maritain. It is also common to hear this idea in many public interventions of the academics that lead the recovery of the Italian civil tradition. For example:

The civil economy makes the person its center, in the line of Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain, and intends to seek the good of all the people without exception. That is precisely the common good (Cortina in Zamagni 2012B).

Another example: when Bruni and Zamagni describe the concept of *subsidiarity* (which is absolutely central in the civil economy tradition), they understand it as a...

[...] personalist principle according to which human beings are not just individuals, but, over all, persons. That means, human being become fully himself in the reciprocal relationship. From the personalist root raises this subsidiarity principle (Bruni and Zamagni 2004, p. 240).

In Spain, one of the academics who have best studied the work of Maritain, Juan Manuel Burgos, establishes a clear link between both traditions:

We estimate that, in Italy, personalism has become a genuine cultural koine in which we found a large number of intellectuals from many different areas (Burgos 1997, p. 145).

However, there are not many papers that study in a deep and clear way the connection between personalism and the Italian civil tradition. In this paper, we aim to describe the anthropology of one of the most representatives of the personalists authors (Jacques Maritain) and demonstrate that it can provide a solid anthropological foundation for the civil tradition and even promote further developments for it.

For that purpose, we will describe the personalist movement (2nd paragraph), Maritain's anthropological system (3rd paragraph), the convergence between both systems (4th paragraph), and a final paragraph with

closing remarks and hypothetical contributions from Maritain's anthropology to the civil economy tradition.

2. THE PERSONALIST MOVEMENT

The anthropological conception of Maritain is incardinated into the French Christian personalism born in the 30s of the twentieth century by Emmanuel Mounier, who popularized it through the magazine *Esprit*. However, Mounier himself declares in the first pages of *Le personalisme* that the first author to use the term was Charles Renouvier in 1903, whose approach to the term *person* is oriented in order to escape from the Kantian theory of knowledge (Rigobello, 1978 p. 16).

The birth of the magazine *Esprit* was planned in Maritain's house in Meudon, outside Paris, after a great number of meetings with (of course, Maritain and Mounier), Nicola Berdjaev, Paul-Louis Landsberg, Georges Izard, André Déléage, Jean Lacroix, André Philip, René Biot, Pierre Vérité, Pierre-Aimé Touchard... However, it is worth mentioning that both Maritain and Berdjaev offered a limited participation because of theoretical disagreements, but *strongly active thanks to the convergence of their Christian testimony* (Rigobello, 1978, p. 8).

The first issue of this magazine was released in October 1932 thanks to the Editorial Desclée and the efforts of Maritain and Marcel, and was presented as a *stance against the culture crisis of this civilization, due to the economic collapse and the political loss* (Rigobello, 1978, p. 7). In a few years, since its distinctly French roots, the personalist movement spreads widely in many thought schools that refer (in a more or less veiled way) to personalism:

The Polish school with K. Wojtyła; the Italian area with authors like Stefanini, Pareyson, Carlini, Buttiglione and R. Guardini; F. Ebner and H.U. von Balthasar in the German-language; J. Marias, A. Lopez Quintas and others in the field of Spanish language... (Burgos, 1997, p. 145).

To this list, Rigobello adds the names of the Italians Rosmini and Carlini, and the Germans Buber and Scheler, whose disciple Landsberg also contributed to the movement of the magazine *Esprit*- (Rigobello, 1978, pp. 9-12).

For Juan Manuel Burgos, the most important intellectual contributions to this line of thought are *to emphasize the centrality of the person; help to fight against the totalizing tendencies of Marxism and Nazism and the exacerbated individualism; to circulate a few concepts previously neglected in some areas of philosophical reflection, as love, donation, dialogue, relationships, etc.* (Burgos, 1997, p. 143).

Still according to Burgos, these contributions brought to the intellectual debate these areas of reflection, offering an important contribution in the process of weakening of totalitarianism. Moreover, their influence has been felt in a number of cultural events, which vary from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN, the anthropological categories used in the Italian Constitution after the World War II or many formulations of Vatican II, particularly the Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* (Burgos, 1997, pp. 143-144).

As for the theoretical limits of personalism, Burgos says that its opponents criticize it arguing scarcity of speculative consistency, since it is based on too flexible and generic principles that continuously border the risk of falling into conceptions as neutral and sweetened that they would lose all force and meaning:

In other words, to claim more results from the personalist movement would lead us to insist on a few subjects and terms already assumed by the cultural environment and, therefore, unprovided of their initial strength (Burgos, 1997, p. 144).

However, Burgos itself suggests that personalism is not as generic as its detractors say, and that, if we looked on it more closely, we may find a relatively clear, precise and powerful conceptual framework (Burgos, 1997, p. 145).

To consider the relevance of these indications, we must question about if personalism is strictly a philosophical school or rather a cultural movement without a strong speculative program. Jean Lacroix denies that personalism is a philosophical school (Lacroix, 1974 Rigobello, 1978). For him, according to the commentary of Rigobello, personalism would not be a proper and true philosophy, as they would like

their most enthusiastic supporters, even a kind of ideology, as defined by their enemies, but an anti-ideology, something like a *reaction phenomenon* (Rigobello, 1978, p. 13). In Lacroix own words:

Personalism is not an ideology, neither a philosophy. For many, the solution would be to consider it as an anti-ideology (Lacroix, 1974 Rigobello, 1978, p. 134).

It seems clear that the term *phenomenon* used by Lacroix and Rigobello refers to the work of Maritain himself, since in *La personne et le bien commun* (1947), the Parisian philosopher argues that personalism is not a school or doctrine, but an *aspiration* or a *phenomenon of reaction* against two opposite errors: totalitarianism and liberal individualism. Personalist thomistic trend -continues Maritain- seeks to avoid both excesses:

There is not a personalist doctrine, but personalist aspirations and a dozen of personalist trends that might have nothing in common but the name of person. Some of them tend (in a greater or lesser degree) to one of the errors behind which they place. There are personalisms with Nietzschean character and personalisms with Proudhon character; personalisms that tend toward dictatorship and personalisms that tend toward anarchy. One of the major concerns of Thomistic personalism is to avoid either extreme (Maritain, 1947, p. 170).

It should be noted that the terms *aspiration* and *phenomenon* used here by Maritain are much more ambiguous than the idea of *thought school*. We think the question is well defined in the terms used by Morot-Sir when he says that personalism is *a line of convergence and regrouping of spiritual energies beyond confessional differences, come together to reject Marxism and extreme liberalism from an ecumenical hope of human reconciliation* (Morot-Sir, 1971, p. 107).

From the above quote from Maritain, we also can deduce that the author locates its thought in the Thomistic anthropological matrix, which considers the most appropriate way of understanding the personalistic phenomenon (we will come back on it in the next paragraph).

So, what are the essence of this movement and the reason of the name *personalism*?

The core of the personalist movement born through the magazine *Esprit* is, according to Rigobello, that *the term person is offered as the benchmark for its action from a sense of urgency and testimony in a troubled France to re-make the Cartesian cogito from the coordinates of the person. From there, his task was to contribute to create a community of people from a matrix with a strong religious orientation* (Rigobello, 1978, pp 7-8.).

From another perspective, Nédoncelle defined it as the doctrine that *gives the person an important place in reality or, a fortiori, that considers it as the only reality. In a sense more accurate, personalism tries to demand respect for the human person in the moral field and in the organization of the human action in society* (Nédoncelle, 1959, in Rigobello, 1978, p. 203).

In the words of Louis Chamming's, any attempt to find a sense of the events according to a political or social thought necessarily presupposes a philosophy of history, albeit implicitly (Chamming's, 2007, p. 61). This is also the dialectical scheme by Maritain, whose anthropological expresses absolute consistency with his historical understanding. For the French philosopher, if the nineteenth century saw the mistakes of individualism and in the twentieth century communism reacted opposing to individualism an exclusively communitarian approach, it is now necessary to oppose to these conceptions the notion of human person. That is, according to Maritain (1947, p. 170), the task of personalism.

It is almost tautological to say that personalism is based on the centrality of the person. The key question, therefore, is to elucidate how this centrality plays its role in personalism and the consequences resulting from it. According to Burgos, the centrality of the person can be raised in two different ways (Burgos 1997, p. 148):

- Generic Centrality: the person is recognized in its value and in its essential dignity. There are many philosophies based on this approach, and certainly, anyone that is offered as compatible with Christian values. The tomistic system can be placed in this approach.

- Structural Centrality: this focus goes beyond the mentioned generic centrality; in this case, the philosophical reflection is technically built around the concept of *person*. That is, the person is not just a relevant fact, but the notion around which the conceptual framework of this particular type of philosophy

is constructed (Burgos 1997, p. 148). The personalist movement places, obviously, in this second perspective.

As we can see, the centrality of the person in the maritainian system is not merely generic, as it is in the Thomistic tradition, but structural. Therefore, according to Burgos, *Maritain's work tries to mediate between Thomism and some personalistic instances. These new elements are responsible of a great part of the intellectual debates and controversies in which he became involved* (Burgos, 1997, p. 146).

In the next section we will go into the anthropological system of Maritain to discuss the role of the person in his system and in the Thomistic thought to appreciate the differences between them.

3. MARITAIN'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL SYSTEM: INDIVIDUALITY - PERSONHOOD

As it is indicated by Lorenzini, it is fairly clear that the starting point in all the maritainian system is its anthropological thought:

It is no exaggerated to say that anthropology is the central and constantly recurring point of his research. The human conception that proposes Maritain underlies to all the themes studied in his works (Lorenzini, 1992, p. 164).

However, despite the importance of anthropology in the Parisian philosopher, he does not offer a systematic treatment of the question: it must be traced throughout his extensive work (Burgos 2006, p. 79). Schematically, the treatment of anthropology in Maritain's system may be exposed like this:

- a) Every great period of civilization has been dominated by our image of the person. It determines our behaviour and our socio-political institutions (Maritain 1945).
- b) Any possibility of regeneration of the human community needs a process of re-discovering the true image of man (Maritain 1945).
- c) The cornerstone of his anthropological development is based on the classic Thomistic distinction between *individuality* and *personhood* (Maritain, 1933). According to it, a healthy political conception depends primarily on the consideration of the *person* (Maritain 1942).

This final point, the distinction between *individuality* and *personhood* seems a key to understand the anthropological construction of Maritain. As he states in *Du régime temporel et de la liberté* (Maritain, 1933), the cornerstone of his anthropological development is based on this distinction.

3.1. Individuality - personhood

Aquinas starts his speculation about personality from the classic definition by Boethius: *individual substance with rational nature*¹. In the analysis of the person, he distinguishes the intellectual part or *inner man* and the sensitive part or *outer man*.²

According to Aquinas, the specific part of the human being is his soul; it makes the difference between him and the rest of living beings:

The human soul is a substance. And not a universal but particular substance. Therefore, it is hypostasis or person. And it cannot be person if it is not human. Then, the soul is the man, for the human person is the man.³

Aquinas adds that only the substance who has the whole nature of the human species is a person. Therefore nor hand, nor foot, nor the soul alone can be considered person.⁴ So, according to Aquinas, the idea of person refers to the whole human being, internal and external, body and soul, and the aims of the

1 *Summa theologica*, part I, q. 29, a. 1.

2 *Summa theologica*, part I, q. 75, a. 5, 1^a answer to the objections.

3 *Summa theologica*, part I, q. 75, a. 4.

4 *Summa theologica*, part I, q. 75, a. 5, 2nd answer to the objections.

person not only concern their material survival or temporary, but also the ultimate purposes of soul, which are spiritual or supratemporal.

In the other hand, Aquinas uses the concept of *individuality* as opposed to the term *specie*. That is, he understands *individual* as mere specification within a group.⁵ Moreover, the idea of variety of individuals inside a species is marked by a mere different arrangement of material elements:

The difference in form comes from a different disposition of the matter, and does not make specific diversity, but only numerical, as the diversity of form in individuals is given by the diversification of matter.⁶

So, Aquinas concludes that the term *individuality* refers to the idea of specification within a species, and it is referred to the material, physical or external aspects of the person; in the other hand, the term *person* is used to refer the whole man, understood as the entity that owns the whole nature of the human species, including the physical dimension and the soul, and which refers to the genuinely own human goals.

This is also the approach received by Maritain, and on which bases all its anthropological elaboration:⁷

- The concept of *individuality* leads to the idea of *specification within a group*. It locates us in the space as a being different to other beings. For this reason, the ontological root of this concept has to do with matter. In other words, individuation comes from the relationship with the material world.

- The concept of *personhood*, in the other hand, no longer refers to a larger whole, but to the idea of wholeness and independence of every human being. Thus, the person is seen as a *microcosm* containing in itself *a whole universe*. So, personality gives to each of us value in ourselves, rights and dignity. Maritain finds the ontological root of personality in the spirit that remains in each of us.

From this distinction, Maritain establishes a clear hierarchical line: as an *individual* (and therefore in the temporal-practical order or *Caesar's things*), the human being is subordinated to the whole; but the whole, at his time, is subordinated to the *person* and must be oriented to serve its ultimate goals (which are supratemporal or *God's things*). As Maritain understands it, *personality* leads us to a new perspective: the fraternal bond between human beings.

[...] *In this way, [the person] is a whole universe in itself, a microcosm, where the whole universe can be contained and that can be given as a love gift for someone else who is for us like "another me".* (Maritain 1947, p. 188).

This constitutive need for fraternal meeting in humans is understood by Maritain as a *way of civilization*. The term *civilization* expresses a universal and inclusive horizon that transcends every culture and should seek the *temporal* good in order to reach the *supratemporal* goods.⁸

One of the most important critiques raised against the maritainian anthropological system has to do with its dual nature, thus he makes a rigid separation between individuality and personhood.⁹ However, a correct understanding of the Thomistic-maritainian anthropology should lead us to understand that, in their system, individuality is good *in order to personality*, so it must be subordinated to it. To make the opposite, that is, to give prominence to individuality is a mistake, because it separates us from the supreme center toward which the person tends. This should not lead us to understand that Maritain despise the temporal good of the person, but subordinates it in importance to the supratemporal good. If the French philosopher insists on personality rather than on individuality, it is because personality offers a more complete vision of the human being. To express it clearly (and, again, regardless of the aforementioned speculative difficulties), to focus on the perspective of individuality or personality has to do with our subjective focus on the human being, and not with the human being itself. Thus, according to the maritainian system, a vision focused on individuality forgets a great part of the human nature.

5 I.e., in *Summa theologica* part I, q. 94, a. 3; part I, q. 92, a. 4°, 2nd answer; part I, q. 88, a. 1, 4th paragraph...

6 *Summa theologica*, part I, q. 85, a. 8, 3rd answer to the objections.

7 He repeats it in many of his works, but it is clearly expressed in *La personne et le bien commun* (1947).

8 We will come over the term *civilization* at the 4.4 paragraph, where we will explain the maritainian idea of *human development*.

9 About this, Lorenzini (1992, p. 167), Burgos (2006, p. 79) and López-Casquete (2014).

The double possibility of approaching the human being, as an individual and as a person, serves to Maritain to denounce the serious anthropological deficiencies that suffer certain forms of social, political and economic constructions, that only consider the material aspects of man (his individuality) and leave out spiritual aspects (his personality), with devastating consequences in terms of respect for human dignity and for his ultimate purposes in life (i.e., liberal bourgeois individualism, Fascism or Marxism, which only take into account the individual-material aspects). If a system only takes into account the purposes of the individual, leads to anarchism or to liberal bourgeois materialism. In contrast, if only serves the common good of individuals, regardless of the person, it leads to collective totalitarianisms. Facing both ends, Maritain claims the common good of the human person as the ultimate goal of society. Moving the same approach to democratic systems, Maritain states that the drama of modern democracies lies in the ignorance of this distinction, because they have tried to build the *city of the person* under the mistake of confusing it with the *city of the individual*:

These reflections lead us to understand that the drama of modern democracies is to have sought without knowing something good: the city of the person, in the guise of an error: the city of the individual (Maritain, 1947, p. 237).

The idea of democracy in Maritain points to a *democracy of the person*, embodied in habits and social structures that allow the participation of all in the common good and where brotherhood is incorporated to the political life. Without fraternity, says in *Christianisme et démocratie* (Maritain, 1943), political experience is without defense against the selfish tendency present in humans. Instead of that, brotherhood allows us to open the doors of our group to all mankind. In this way, class antagonisms and totalitarianism would be overcome, and we could advance beyond capitalism and socialism (as both of them are based on a materialist conception of life) to build the authentic city of man.

3.2. Contents of Maritain's anthropology

We will describe the contents of Maritain's anthropology through three items: *sociability, freedom and love*.

a) Sociability

As it is suggested by Aquinas in *De regimine principum*, the man needs society to lead his existence: *est igitur necessarium homini, quod in multitudine vivat* (Aquinas, 1971, pp. 1-2). It is in society where man receives the necessary knowledge to develop himself as a person; rational knowledge, therefore, comes from the communication act, which becomes a synthetic category constitutive of the principle of human society (Botturi, 1994, p. 14). This makes the man, in the words of Aquinas, *magis communicativus* over other animals because he can express himself through universal concepts instead of simply notify passions common with the rest of their peers. It underlies here the Aristotelian-rooted distinction between *phoné* and *logos* that shows a higher sociability degree in humans compared to other animals.

It means that man can transcend the pure subjective state and generate a common idea about what is right and wrong and what should be the family or the city (*koinonía*) through communication. Language becomes therefore in the realization of human relationality, and reveals the social ontology of the person itself (Botturi, 1994, p. 16). The advantage of the communicative argument is that it is offered as a synthesis of the double human polarity (individuality - personhood), since communication expresses the social need of man from both perspectives: as *content* in the case of material individuality and as *form* from the perspective of personal rationality (Botturi, 1994, p. 16). Thus, communication can be understood as an expression of generosity of the person, which tends to *super abound in the social communication, according to the law inscribed in the depths of being, of life, intelligence and love* (Maritain, 1947, p. 197).

Some of the newest research lines in sociology also point to communication as a mean to articulate human relationality. For example, the dispute between Mead and Schutz about if the communication process founds social relationship or vice versa (Gattamorta, 2012, p. 95). Also the discourse ethics from Apel and Habermas argues that communication opens the world of mutual recognition: only in the encounter with others we can find what is right. This ethical discovery of the other starts with Hegel, who states that mutual recognition is the core of social life.

Also Maritain (1947, chapter 4) states that, according to both dimensions (as an individual and as a person), the human being needs society:

- According to our needs as an individual (moral, educational, mutual aid...) we need society to provide us the conditions that we need to exist and develop. Some of these needs, such as education, are referred to a historicized and progressive process.

- According to personality, we need society as the place to reach and express our development horizons: openness and superabundance of love that requires relationships with others.

Although the man needs society from both dimensions, Maritain says that society (*the city*, as he says) is composed of people, not of individuals. That is, the social unit is the person. Although the person is understood as a whole, it is constitutively and necessarily open to society. Therefore, states Maritain (1942) that we cannot be a man without living among men: man is a political animal, and society (both familiar and civil) is a requirement of our human nature.

This anthropological reflection is crucial to understand the maritainian approach to the idea of justice. The person needs of society and is also part of it. Society is bigger and better than its parts, and its common good exceeds the sum of the particular good of individuals who compose it. But, on the other hand, the person is a whole universe in itself, and is beyond and superior to every temporal society. From this perspective, society and the common good are indirectly subordinated to the full development of the person and its supra-temporal dimension.

The common good of the temporal city is essentially subordinated to the good of the human being taken as person (Maritain, 1933, p. 366).

This approach may seem somewhat paradoxical: the human being is subordinated to the collective common good but, at the same time, community is subordinated to him. Maritain explains this issue in *Les droits de l'homme et la loi naturelle* (1942) with an extremely clear example: an athlete, at the time of the race, focuses exclusively on the competition. However, his condition of athlete does not embrace all its dimensions; out of the race, there are for the athlete a personal universe. Similarly, the person is entirely oriented to the practical good of political society, but not in all its dimensions. As Botturi says, *it keeps a space of transcendence of the person with respect to the political whole which also inherently belongs* (Botturi, 1994, p. 25).

b) Freedom

We said that the idea of *individuality* refers to the material and sensible world; thus, says Maritain in *Du régime temporel et de la liberté* (1933), a feature of individuality is the greed of the *ego*, eager to take for him. As individuals, our unity is precarious, since we are mere fragments of a species. Personality, in contrast, is a deeper mystery rooted in the reminiscence of the spirit.

To be deciphered -continues Maritain-, it should be noted that personality is deeply linked to love. Thus, love is presented as the authentic horizon of human perfection. At this point we find a paradox: if love is constitutive of the human being, how can we understand it as our *horizon of perfection*? Maritain solves it saying that *we must earn what we are*, because our most important task is to approach our practical existence to our ontological essence. Curcio explains this issue saying that the person is not only *per se subsistens*, but also requires to develop a *per se operans* (Curcio, 2010, pp. 41-42).

This important distinction gives access to human freedom in the heart of the process of building and understanding personality, because -still following Curcio- without freedom, man is a mere individual slave of events and circumstances, unable to direct his own life. Without freedom, the man *is nothing else that a part of the whole, and would be incapable of being a whole in himself* (Curcio, 2010, p. 42).

Therefore, there is an active role of the person in updating his own identity; in other words, our development project points to a progressive approach of our practical development and our essence and our, understood as persistence of spirit. Obviously, this process is always unfinished. Possenti understands it as an asymptote: *the asymptote of indefinite progress would be perfection* (Possenti, 2007, p. 39). From this perspective, its unreachable character does not imply denial.

According to Curcio, this development process has to do primarily with the development of our capacity of love, because only love can expand the horizon of subjectivity through the richness of the meeting and welcome to the other people, of relationality as shared search for the ultimate goals of life:

Therefore, a relationality that becomes the basis of truth, but a basis that finds in love its first step, right channel for searching the truth (Curcio, 2010, p. 42).

In the process, our choice is to follow the path of material individuality (as it is proposed by materialist ideologies) or the path of personality (as it is proposed by personalism). So Maritain (1947, chapter 3) believes that education is *the difficult art of growing the person and decreasing the individual*.

In reference to this active role and the consequent possibility of choice in humans, Maritain distinguishes in *Du régime et de la liberté* (1933) three philosophies of freedom:

1. The first one understands freedom as having an option to choice; this *option to choice* is considered by this philosophy as an end in itself. This conception points to a liberal-individualistic philosophy, who understands that the only limit to the human action is the freedom of the others; it is only focused on the pursuit of personal well-being, and not justice or the common good. This approach, led to the terms used by Bruni and Zamagni (2004), is oriented towards the idea of *total good*.

2. The second one is based on an understanding of freedom as *autonomy*, but embodied in the supreme goal of the State (Hegel), understood as a Leviathan that enslaves men given to him. This produces a search for temporary purposes and the abandon of the ultimate goals of human life. This conception would be focus, continuing with the terms used by Bruni and Zamagni (2004), to the *collective good*.

3. The third one has to do with the Thomist perspective also proposed by Maritain. His approach is that it is necessary to create human conditions for the men, but with the purpose of approaching together the final complete freedom. In this way, it would be possible to build *the city*, which is based on justice and friendship. Only from this freedom we can point at the *common good* (Bruni and Zamagni, 2004).

c) Love

In the maritainian anthropological system, personality invites us to give ourselves thanks to the expansiveness and generosity present in our ontological structure; that is, personality is a source of unification with other people *from within*. Therefore, communication and love are essential contents of personality. So, says Maritain in *Pour la justice* (1945), as we give ourselves more, more intense is personality life in us. For the philosopher, love is not based on the qualities of the person beloved, but comes from the center of personality, which nature is metaphysical, and enables the human being to give himself. According to Maritain, love does not aim qualities or essences, but people. Clearly, Maritain establishes a link between *self-donation* and *existence* as a person.¹⁰

Maritain understands this *vocation to love* (and therefore to the self-gift) as constitutive of the human being. It orients its ultimate goals in life and marks its development horizon. For this reason, existing as a person is inextricably linked to the experience of love and self-giving. This vocation to self-gift as an expression of love -says Maritain- constitutes us as persons. Our choice is to accept the call or not.

This link between the self-gift of and existence as a person is also present in other personalist authors. I.e., for Mounier there are three essential exercises to construct the person: *meditation* (which allows us to discover our vocation), *commitment* to the work of self-recognition and *self-gift* (Mounier, 1955, in Rigobello, 1978, p. 128).

We find another example in Nédoncelle:

[...] But from the point of view of the person, the question is an act which identifies with a donor or a gift almost anonymous conspiring with the existence of the subject (Nédoncelle, 1959, in Rigobello, 1978 p. 173).

¹⁰ We will come back on it on the 4.3 paragraph.

The experience of self-giving opens us to a new encounter perspective: the fraternal bond. From the perspective of gift and love, we can perceive people as "others myself".

The biggest critique that Maritain makes to modernity is that it has progressively pushed out the idea of transcendence. According to that process, we have lost the reflection about our ultimate goals in life and our consequent vocation to make the gift of us. Thus, the bourgeois liberal society provides a common life without common good or common task to be accomplished. But Maritain not only places this circumstance in the context of the XIX century liberal-bourgeois society, but extends it to the social orientations of the twentieth century. Thus, it states that the society of his time looked for the satisfaction of his desires without raising an internal reform of the person. It is in the bond of love where the author places the possibility of human emancipation. As Lorenzini says,

If the man were completely far from his peers, if he had never had the possibility of communicate with others [...] it would have never had the opportunity of acting according to the contents that mainly characterizes human life as distinctively human (Lorenzini, 1994, pág. 178).

Balance

The concept of person that we have just described provides the starting point of the *integral humanism* that Maritain proposes: a humanism that finds in transcendence the common link of all men, that allows the expansion of our capacity of love and commitment, which is identified by the author as the highest potential for human development. This ideal is called to materialize in the social order through the communion and the construction of the *fraternal city*. According to it, he considers in *Christianisme et démocratie* (1943) that there is only one principle of liberation and hope: love, genuine link of the city, which overflows its limits and extends to all mankind. This responds to the deepest inclinations of the human race and generates faith in the brotherhood. This also means understanding that the only important political task is *to build a house for the brothers*.

4. CONVERGENCE BETWEEN MARITAIN'S SYSTEM AND THE CIVIL ECONOMY TRADITION

Undoubtedly, the economic tradition that best identifies with the thought of Jacques Maritain is the Civil Economy. Not surprisingly, one of the leading scholars who works in the recovery of the Civil Tradition, Stefano Zamagni, often states in his public speeches that the philosophical foundation of this movement is in the French personalism of the twentieth century, mainly in the philosophical work of Maritain, Mounier and Ricoeur, whose common denominator is the claim of the primacy of the person against the attacks of Marxist materialism and liberal individualism. Currently, the Marxist materialism is not proposed as an alternative; it is liberal individualism who, nowadays, questionates the concept of person.

However, the civil tradition was born long before the twentieth century. The term *civil economy* begins to be used in the XVIII century, after the creation of the first chair of Economic History at Naples in 1754: the *Cattedra di Commercio e Meccanica*. The first scholar who occupied this chair was Antonio Genovesi (1713-1769), whose most important work, written between 1765 and 1769, had the title of *Lezioni di Economia Civile* (Genovesi, 2013). A few years later, in 1772, it was created a new chair in Modena who holds the title of *Cattedra di Economica Civile*; it was occupied primarily by Agostino Paradisi (Bruni and Zamagni in Genovesi, 2013, p. IX).

Even Genovesi's doctrinal development roots in an older tradition that began in the Italian Middle Age, that bloomed in the civil humanism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and remained until the illustrated age, when the market was conceived as an institution based on the principle of reciprocity and the exercise of civic virtues.

The concept *civil economy* fell into disuse in the late eighteenth century, when it was considered *unscientific*. In this process it is considered a highly negative opinion the judgment expressed by Francesco Ferrara, the most influential nineteenth century Italian economist (Bruni and Zamagni in Genovesi, 2013, page XX.):

The merits of the foundation of the economy belong to Smith (British) or a Turgot (French), but not to Genovesi, Verri or Beccaria (Ferrara, 1852, book II, p. XXXVI).

Thus, the Italian economists begin to face to the economic thought developed in France and England, and to consider as unimportant their own tradition, which was progressively forgotten.

However, after that *notte del civile* (“night of civil”), nowadays some scholars are talking about a new *primavera del civile* (“springtime of civil”) (Tabarro, 2010, p. 47), mainly because of the efforts of a group of Italian scholars led by Stefano Zamagni, Luigino Bruni and Leonardo Becchetti. It is not casual that in 2013 it has published a reprint of the *Lezioni di Economia Civile* by Antonio Genovesi, by Francesca Dal Degan, whose previous edition dated from the years 1768 to 1770.¹¹

According to Zamagni, civil economy is not properly a *school of thought*, but a research program in the way proposed by Lakatos (1974), with a *hard core* (which in this case would be the natural human relationality and the final goal of the common good and public happiness) and a *protective belt*. Civil economy offers an alternative to neoliberalism and neostatalism; but its main contribution is that it provides a cultural perspective to reinterpret the whole economy and thus generate a new economic theory (Bruni and Zamagni, 2004, p. 15). In its root is the rejection of the idea that economic rationality must be separated of any reference to values and ethical guidelines to focus (just like the natural sciences) in the scientific study of the facts. The authors who join this tradition, by contrast, believe that the ethical orientation has to be present in the economic rationality, because they do not exclude mutually.

One of the key concepts proposed by the civil tradition is the idea of *reciprocity*, which derives from a social conception consistent with the social nature of man. According to this reciprocal perspective, relationships are not understood as a mean to get advantages; even the market is understood by Genovesi as a place to practice mutual aid. It is not enough, therefore, *sociability*, but also *reciprocity* is required, even in the market. That is why, for Genovesi, it is necessary to reformulate the anthropology of human relationality through the conception of man as constitutively marked by the need of relationships.

We return now on the main purpose of this article, which is to show the intense convergence between Maritain's work and the principles of the Italian civil tradition. In the words of Rigobello, French personalism of Mounier and Maritain found in Italy an intellectual matrix widely convergent with their postulates; to illustrate it, Rigobello (1978, p. 10) quotes Toniolo, Sturzo and Stefanini. Possenti, meanwhile, also cites three Italian authors in connection with Maritain: as Rigobello, he mentions Sturzo (whose reflection on Christian-inspired democracy is much coincident with Maritain's) and also adds two other authors: Rosmini and Dossetti (Possenti, 2003, p. 159 et seq.).

We will express this convergence through six items:

4.1. Link between technique and ethics

Both systems claim to leave behind a vision of the economy guided by purely technical efficiency to considerate ethics as a necessary guide to reach the ultimate ends of human activity, according to a sense of eudemonistic happiness.

According to Bruni and Zamagni (2004, p. 15), *civil economy* is not properly a *thought school*, but a *research program*. But we also find a certain prophetic character that claims the re-joint of technique and ethics. In this way, humanities can offer to empirical sciences their axiological orientation. That implies to deny the *non overlapping magisteria* and make the economy become again (as it was in its origins) a felicitating science.

One point in common between civil tradition and Maritain's work is that both consider Machiavelli as one of the architects of modernity when he separates ethics and politics. Bruni and Zamagni regard him as one of the authors that led Europe to the *night of civil* (*notte the civile*). The contrast between Machiavelli and the civil tradition is clear; Machiavelli wants to help the Prince just to stay in power as a ruler separated of the people. In Genovesi we read the opposite:

¹¹ It was a 825 copies edition in two volumes of his work *Lezioni di commercio o sia di economia civile*, published by Paolo y Nicola De Simone brothers in Naples in 1768-1770.

...the spiritual oppression of the peasants, the shepherds, the artists, because they do not have the pleasure of feeling men, because they die without knowing that they are co-citizens with the lords (Genovesi 2013, p. 45).

Also for Maritain, Machiavellian revolution is essentially anthropological. Machiavelli embodies a new pessimistic anthropology in which the basis of social coexistence is not mutual love, but mutual fear. That's why people need the assistance of the Prince to free the subjects (no longer citizens) of destructive conflict that triggers the uncivilized animal.

As Maritain writes in *De la politique justice* (1940, chapter 6), Machiavelli provokes a split between technology and ethics. The Machiavellian Prince is only interested in knowing and applying the technique that allows him to get and maintain the power, without taking into consideration any ethical implications.

This approach was introduced into the economic science in the modern age and is still kept in it: the claim of savage capitalism is to find and apply the economic technique that allows enrich apart from any ethical considerations. In this line, the liberal conception considers the market as an ethically-neutral zone; the clearest expression of this would be the *invisible hand* of Adam Smith: each individual strives for his own benefit, while an invisible hand leads him to promote an objective that he did not consider; in this way, just pursuing his own interests, he promotes social interests more effectively than if he really intended to promote them.¹²

Thus, the market is technically legitimized *a priori*, because no other ethical warranty is required. This separation between techniques and ethics completes the process initiated by Machiavelli, denounced both by Maritain and the civil tradition, and represents the triumph of the *non overlapping magisteria* recommended in 1829 by Richard Whatley, Protestant bishop and scholar at Oxford University. However, we must reject the idea that the market is self-legitimized *ex-ante*. On the contrary, it is essential to recall ethics to get a legitimacy which is not given in advance. In the words of Zamagni:

The economist cannot hide behind a supposed neutrality of values when producing models and theories, especially when it is aware that the products of his scientific work generate a certain way of thinking and are taken as a reference by the politicians (Zamagni, 2013, p. 72).

Maritain also states the need to eliminate the Machiavellian-rooted fracture between *ethics* and *economy*, as well as that between *spiritual* and *temporal* life. To address this transformation, Maritain prefers to avoid the use of the word *revolution*, as it often refers to the idea of great changes but purely external and material. Instead of that, following Péguy, Maritain suggests that *the social revolution will be moral or it will not be* (Maritain, 1933, p. 443).

Consequently, says Maritain in *Pour le bien commun* (1934), the task to undertake is not only technical, but primarily human and social: to illuminate the socio-political problems with the light of spiritual life. It wakes up in the man a horizon of fraternal communion embodied in a common political task to be accomplished. This *common political task* is the central idea where Maritain bases his entire reflection on justice and economy; it is related in his system to the term *common good* (we will return in section 4.6).

4.2. Centrality of the person, not of the individual

Many of the Italian civil authors claim that it is urgent to rethink the role of the human being in the economic science, because the concept of the individual (in which economic science is based) is much more limited than the concept of personhood, and it's unable to respond to the challenges of our time. So when Zamagni criticizes the mainstream emerging from classical economics, he says:

The well-known theories of contracts, companies, prices, etc., do not need the category of person. It is enough for them to consider a well informed and rational individual. [...] If I'm right in what I say, in the latest developments in economic theory I find a genuine interest on the relational paradigm centered on the idea of person (Zamagni 2006, p. 37-38).

12 This approach fits with the Fable of the Bees by Mandeville.

The link with Maritain's anthropological approach is here more evident than anywhere else, since the civil economy appears to vindicate the distinction between individual and person. Thus, for the Italian civil tradition, the economy science in the last centuries has been built to fit the individual, becoming a science that relates only to material aspects of man and leaves in the shadows the ultimate goals of the person and its possibilities of happiness, which is converted into a private topic, or even considered a matter for other disciplines. The problem is not only the consequent impoverishment of economics; thus, this view has generated a market *ethos* based solely on material aspects, which tends to make it a dehumanized place, unable to help the person to achieve its ends. It also makes us run into the risk of extending this ethical logic to other areas of social activity. In other words, civil tradition claims for an economy science built at the measure of the person, not just at the measure of the individual.

The Italian civil tradition, therefore, claim for a decidedly personalist Economy; that is, an economical science in which the person is contemplated as a whole, and not just under a merely material focus. In the center of this proposal lays the idea that market can become a meeting place and a privileged context to experience the natural human sociability that bind us to other human beings and that allows us to build a more just and fraternal society.

As we said before, the connection between the civil tradition and Maritain's personalism is here more evident than anywhere else. As we know, the maritainian system bases its development on the distinction between *individuality* and *personhood*, and concludes that any economic system based on a materialist worldview necessarily refers to the individuality and leaves personality out. In the words of the author, these systems can only know *the shadow* of personality: its material individuality. In particular, the author refers in *La personne et le bien commun* (1947) to the liberal-bourgeois individualism and to communism:

- The bourgeois liberal individualism is based *on property, business, pleasures, and the omnipotence of the State* (Maritain, 1947, p. 228). Thus, the man claims to the State to satisfy his hunger and refuse any political edge to it. This approach bases on a concept of man understood only as an individual, as part of the whole, but not as a whole in itself. That is, personality is ignored. In this system, the individual remains isolated in its selfishness, prisoner of his greed and blind to any reference to the common good, claiming the State to warranty an illusory freedom.

- Communism, meanwhile, is a reaction against the injustices of individualism. Its anthropological basis gives primacy to the collective man, not the person, and understood society as a purely economic community, to which individuals are subordinated. That is, Marx claims that economy is the ultimate reason of history; his error -says Maritain- is not only to preach the preponderance of economy, but also to understand that every life as dependant of it. Thus, for communism, the main work of men has to do with its economic role. This, for Maritain, is a radial ignorance of the person and its value. The French philosopher considers communism as a reaction against the abuses of the bourgeois liberal capitalism, a logical reaction that claims for the human dignity offended by the savage capitalism. Nevertheless, Maritain believes that he is wrong to attack it by the denouncing the private property, as it is stated in the Marxist theory of surplus value. The sick part of capitalism -says Maritain- is not private property, but its ethical and spiritual values, who forget the primacy of the person and his ordination to love and freedom.

So, according to Maritain (1933), the problem is not capitalism but the specific way in which it is incarnated as a system based on the idea of the primacy of money and economic performance as a form of civilization. Thus, the person who has nothing is relegated to the shame, and its personhood results denied. If their working conditions have improved, it is because its performance decreased or he became dangerous. Even the powerful people have become dehumanized in their greed, as they become mere consumers. For Maritain, the root of these perversions lies in the lack of love.

4.3. Gift and gratuity

According to Zamagni (2012A, p. 14), there is no hope in a society merely just but without fraternity and gratuity. The convergence at this point with Maritain's system is undeniable. The joint of justice and fraternal friendship is a true *leitmotif* in Maritain. For him, the first condition of a good policy is to be just: justice is the measure of progress of the common good and the values of civilization. But if modern democracies seek to build a just city regardless of brotherly love, human rights are misleading to lose all sense of purpose (Maritain, 1934).

Both systems claim for the need of correcting the deviations and injustices that inevitably provokes the social, political and economic life; to get it, both contemplate the need of a social stable behaviour based on the principle of gratuitousness as an expression of the fraternal bond between humans. The final goal would be to avoid that some people were condemned to economic irrelevance. Thus, Zamagni,

An economical relational science needs to give place to the gratuity principle (Zamagni 2006, p. 46).

To incorporate the gratuity principle means to claim the dignity of every human being because, according to reciprocity, everyone has something to offer to society. Also the idea of reciprocity is present in the personalist movement. In Maritain's system, gratuity principle has a central role. Thus, he establishes a link between donation and existence, reformulating in that way the Cartesian *cogito*:

To self-give we have to exist (Maritain 1947, p. 191).

In that way, the maritainian *cogito* could be: *dono me ipsum, ergo sum; I give myself, so I exist*. In our opinion, this link between gift and existence is one of the most interesting ideas in the Parisian philosopher. Maritain understood the vocation to love, and therefore the gift, as *constitutive* in the human being: existing as a person is inextricably linked to the experience of love and self-giving. Simply stated, the call to the gift as an expression of love constitutes us as persons. It is just this idea what gives direction to the authentic human development process in the personalist movement.

This openness to fraternity is the destination point in the thinking about justice of the maritainian system. It means to discover in the temporal world a deeper sense of human dignity. Thus, we can substitute a commercial civilization based on the fecundity of money for a personalist civilization based on human rights as person, citizen and worker (Maritain, 1945). The experience of civic friendship cannot be understood without proximity and equality. Maritain understands it as the effort to give oneself to each other; hence its political value. This ideal -continues Maritain- response to the deepest aspirations of the human nature, and its implementation depends on the realization of human dignity and its transcendent vocation.

Bruni and Zamagni (2004), by their side, argue that the Civil Economy is based on the simultaneous operation of three principles: the exchange of equivalents (contract), the redistribution of wealth (public welfare systems) and the gift as reciprocity. This last principle is described by them in a similar way than it is described by Maritain: contemplating the convenience of contractual efficiency and the value of the various forms of welfare, they understand that happiness is only reachable from relationality and fraternity, according to which each person feels involved in the fate of the others. Through relational behaviour and growing parcels of gift and gratuitousness, the company is set to the bond of brotherhood, from which the common good is articulated. In this social model, freedom is understood as positive liberty, and refers to the possibility of carrying out the plan of life itself and thus the possibility of being happy in the sense of Aristotelian *eudaimonia* (while freedom in the negative sense refers to the absence of constraints or limitations). So far, no social model has managed to implement the three principles together. Social State (or Welfare State) has managed to harmonize -in different degrees in every country or historical moment- the first two principles: a benevolent State that redistributes according to equity the wealth that the market produces according to efficiency. If the second principle is also removed, the resulting socio-economic model is the philanthropic capitalism currently in vogue in the US. In this model, the market is free to maximize the production of wealth; some large companies practice philanthropy with disadvantaged by charity oriented from compassion to reduce some negative effects provoked by market (and not its causes). In that context, there is no *self-gift* (which implies a personal relationship) but *present* (which involves only the supply of goods for free in a depersonalized way) (Bruni and Zamagni, 2004, p. 23). Communism eliminates the principle of *equivalent exchange*, and thus the efficiency, leading to disastrous results in terms of poverty. The objective of the Civil Economy is to implement the three principles at the same time, so that efficiency, equity and fraternity are not kept in separate spheres, but can live together, including in the area of the market. The greatest difficulty that faces the Civil Economy is that the mainstream economic thinking has made us believe for centuries that the objective of the market must be necessarily the maximization of profit or utility:

The reductionism which seems to suffer the economic science represents both the main obstacle to the entry of new ideas in the discipline and a dangerous form of protectionism against the critiques arising from the facts and from other social sciences (Zamagni, 2008, p. 169).

The economic science only can take into consideration gift and reciprocity if it clarifies that the pursuit of profit is not one of the foundations of the economy, but a possible conception of it. As Zamagni says, to exit from *this economy* does not mean to exit from *the economy*; to confound both things would be a serious and naive epistemological error (Zamagni, 2012B, p. 11).

4.4. The horizons of human development

Maybe, the most important idea in Maritain's work is to give back to social-political reflection the meaning of ultimate ends of human beings; this is also the purpose of the civil tradition in the economic field. In the current development of this tradition, it is considered necessary to rethink the assumptions of economic science according to which it made us falsely believe that *being happy* is the same as *having money*. But the reality is very different, as it is shown by the Easterlin paradox: at a certain economic level, the increase in per capita income lowers subjective well-being.

Many authors in the Italian civil tradition consider *relational goods* as an important theoretical tool to explain the paradoxes of happiness (for instance, Bartolini in Zamagni 2008, p. 182). Genovesi also considers this idea of happiness as expression of the human relational nature, and hinges on the paradox that happiness arises from the fact of making others happy. For him, happiness as a relational element is developed through the practice of civil virtue, and grows up to become fraternity. It is right to that ideal, the construction of fraternal city, where maritainian system points at. We have already expressed the link in Maritain's system between gift and happiness in the precedent point, when we talked about his reformulation of the Cartesian cogito: *dono me ipsum , ergo sum; I give myself , so I exist*.

The idea of human development is understood by Maritain as a *civilization project*. In *Humanisme integral* (1936), Maritain discusses about the term *civilization*, which he understands as the material and moral development of human life itself. Thus, he conceives that this *civilization project* has two poles: the economic and the spiritual. The term *civilization* manifests a universal and inclusive horizon, which transcends all cultures and should seek the *temporal good* without loosing the horizon of the *supratemporal good*. This idea of universal and inclusive civilization construction is also present in the work of Zamagni. This author contrasts the terms *politics* and *civilization* in this way: political term refers to the Greek *polis*, where only a minority of citizens could make part of the public institutions (slaves, foreigners and women were excluded). In contrast, the term *civilization* refers to the Roman idea of *cives*, whose character is clearly inclusive. Further, the idea of *public happiness* in Rome did not have to do with the sum of the individual welfare of the citizens, but implied the reject of personal well being if it could improve the public happiness.¹³

In the same way, when Maritain refers to this *civilization horizon* of the person, he uses the term *city*. According to him, the bases of the *city* are justice and fraternal friendship:

The requirements of the common good go much further and ask for friendship, apart from justice, in the city structure (Maritain, 1933, p. 503).

This idea appears very often in Maritain works and in other personalist authors, as Lacroix:

The ancients themselves saw in friendship the foundation of the City [...]. In legal relations people are still strangers and external to each other: they do not meet directly. On the contrary, friendship represents the essence in their personality, at once indestructible and irreducible (Lacroix, 1942, in Rigobello, 1978, pp. 129-130).

4.5. Principle of subsidiarity

Another nuance that seems interesting to note is that Italian civilian economy vigorously embodies the *principle of subsidiarity*, amply present in the work of Maritain, as it gives prominence to the civil society.

¹³ Many biographies of famous people testimony this idea, such as Agrippa, who often paid public works with his own funds. It is evident how far away are our societies from such conceptions of the common good.

Let's see how Maritain raises the principle of subsidiarity. In *Du régime temporel et de la liberté* (Maritain, 1933), the author points to a post-capitalist society where the *principle of subsidiarity* would be central, and where the State should have as little weight as possible, giving the preeminent position to the civil society. Also in *Humanisme intégral* (Maritain, 1936), the author indicates that, contrary to the idea of *unity* in the medieval Christianity, we need to create a pluralistic system who avoids the administrative centralism, who implements respect for minorities and give prominence to the civil organizations that make the *politic body (corp politique)*¹⁴, which is the basis of the political and social structure. This idea finds its origin in the *principle of subsidiarity* raised by Pius XI, who stated that the different social groups should enjoy as much autonomy as possible. In *The man and the State* (Maritain, 1952), the author says that the civilization project contained in his work should be articulated according to the principle of subsidiarity, which enables the material and spiritual improvement of the human conditions. For this, they are required great social transformations, the existence of a supranational authority and a strong commitment with the pursuit of the common good.

When Bruni and Zamagni describe the *subsidiarity principle*, they understand it as emanation of the *personalist principle according to which the human being is not just an individual but, over all, a person. That means, the man becomes fully himself in the reciprocal relationship with others. From it personalist roots comes the subsidiarity principle, according to which, apart from efficiency and effectiveness, we have to promote institutions strong in personal relations* (Bruni y Zamagni, 2004, p. 240).

Still following Bruni and Zamagni (2004), civil logic raises the need of a new welfare, not from the State but from the civil society, universal and therefore cohesive. In line with Amartya Sen, Bruni and Zamagni raise a concept of *welfare* enabling of the person, understood not just as charity. In other words, we need to harmonize welfare systems with solidarity and subsidiarity. The scheme derived from the civil tradition escapes from a vision in which the State retains the monopoly of management and planning the welfare systems, implemented with the help of the *third sector* organizations, and also from a compassionate conservatism where attention to the needs depends on philanthropy and voluntary action of individuals, and only in a subsidiary way by the State. Instead of that, the civil tradition proposes a new welfare model in which civil society can participate in the planning and design of the public services that the State should pay. Therefore, the institutions of civil society would be recognized not only legally, but also economically. This system claims for these entities economic independence in the management of services.

Also Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have emphasized the relationship between happiness and the degree of participation of the person in the civil life (Zamagni, 2012A, p. 261). The approach of the civil tradition is similar, as it highlights the importance of the public sphere as a place of expression of individuals, from the respect for diversity and the civil primacy according to the principle of subsidiarity.¹⁵ In the background is the idea that the competitive democratic model no longer works to satisfy the demands of advanced and complex societies like ours.

4.6. Common good

The idea of the common good is absolutely central in the thinking about justice and economy contained in the work of Jacques Maritain. It is a concept of Aristotelian-Thomist clear genealogy; Aquinas understands the concept of common good policy as *to lead what is governed to its natural end*:

[...] But the justice which orients the men to the common good is a general virtue because of their its: because it orders all the acts from all the virtues to their own end; that is, the common good (Book II, Chapter 60, Article 4, second answer to the objections).

Aquinas assumes that the *common good* of the political society means has to do with the task of pursuit the final human purpose, which ultimately aims to divine contemplation. Hence, the common good must serve to both dimensions: temporal or *good community life* and supernatural. Both dimensions compose the *bonum commune civitatis*.

14 In our view, it would be reasonable to identify the maritenian *corp politique* with the *civil society* in the Italian tradition (the same idea is in Fernández Aguayo 2011, p. 42).

15 Similiar to the idea of *corp politique* in Maritain.

In the modern age, the concept of *common good* moved from its classic Aristotelian-Thomist roots, as it begins to light up a new anthropology where the human being is considered self-sufficient and able to choose his own purposes. Thus, society is understood as an articulated rational plan based on a social contract between individuals with different conceptions of the good to be pursued by the political society. So, they began gradually to abandon the purpose of finding the same common good shared by all the men, and progressively replaced it by the reference to the idea of *law* (Argandoña, 2011, p. 8).

In the context of confrontation with totalitarianism of the twentieth century, Maritain takes up the idea of *common good* and places it at the center of his understanding of the social, economic and political life. The content of this term in Maritain is expressed in *Les droits de l'homme et la loi naturelle* (Maritain, 1942). It is consistent with his Aristotelian-Thomist eudemonistic position: the common good involves the construction of the *good life* of the crowd, including the improvement of living conditions and the material and spiritual progress. It is a work which, being performed by personal individuals, requires the *good* of the whole and of each part of it.

In line with this, the concept of *common good* includes both the collective and the individual aspect; from this understanding, Maritain (1942) concludes that, in the individualistic bourgeois society, there is no a common project to build, because in it there is a mere demand for personal protection and freedom for the individual to pursue his own particular well-being. In the Communism, however, there is a common task to perform, which is the industrial domination of nature, but rejects the *good life* while demands the sacrifice of the person. In other words, if we ignore that the whole is composed by persons, we get into a totalitarian vision. In the other hand, if we understood society only as the sum of individuals' utility, we are lead into a liberal-anarchic vision.

From the Thomist-maritainian position, the *good* that political society must build is *common* because it is universal, and therefore inclusive. It is not good for some, or even good for the majority, but *a good for everyone, because they are members of the same society* (Argandoña, 2011, p. 5). The aim of political society, therefore, is to ensure the social, political and economic conditions that can make possible the *good life* of everyone. The content of the common good is complex and varied, since it includes all those goods necessary for the maintenance and integral development of the human person in society: material, institutional, cultural, moral and spiritual. (Botturi, 1994, p. 24).

Also Civil Economy suggest that economic activity should be oriented towards the common good, which is *the good of everyone without exception*, and both understand it as the way of providing society the pre-conditions that every person needs to complete his integral development process. This orientation to the common good is present in almost all the classic authors of the Italian civil tradition (Leonardo Bruni, Matteo Palmieri, Antonino of Florence, Bernardino da Feltre, Antonio Genovesi, Giacinto Dragonetti, Cesare Beccaria, Pietro Verri, Giandomenico Romagnosi...) and also in the current ones (Becchetti, Bruni, Zamagni...).

In the words of Tabarro, the civil tradition places the person at the center, and establishes the mission for the economy of contributing to the material, social, cultural and spiritual common good (Tabarro, 2010, p. 11).

When Zamagni analyzes the concept of *common good*, he usually opposes it with the concept of *total good* as an aggregate of individual utilities. To explain it, he uses this example (Zamagni, 2010, pp 72-73.): we can understand the *total good* as a sum; so, if some of the summands are zero, the result of the addition may still be positive. Instead, the *common good* is like a multiplication, in which, if any of the factors is zero, the end result will also be zero. That is, a society based in the pursuit of *total good* (principle of exchange of equivalents) admits the existence of individuals that sum zero; instead, a society based in the pursuit of the *common good* (principle of reciprocity) will not consent to have persons in it reduced to the economic irrelevance. In other words, in the logic of the *common good cannot be substitution or compensation: we cannot sacrifice some people for the sake of improving the welfare of others, because each one is a human person* (Zamagni, 2012A, p. 236). In the words of Filangeri,

The exorbitant wealth of some citizens and the idleness of some other suppose the unhappiness and misery of the majority. This civil partiality is contrary to the public good. A state is not rich and happy unless every citizen with a decent job can easily supply his family needs (Filangeri, 2003, p. 12).

The defining issue of the *common good* is that, in it, *the advantage obtained by each one thanks to be part of the community cannot be separated from the advantage obtained by the rest of the people. The*

interest of each is carried along with that of others and not against (as it happens in the private good) or ignoring the interests of others (as it happens in the public good). In this sense, common is the opposite of own, as public is the opposite of private (Zamagni, 2012A). Instead, for the total good there is no person but faceless individual.

Also in the Civil Economy, the content of the common good not only point to *material conditions*, but also to the practice of virtue, and primarily to the experience of fraternal bond and civic friendship as sources of integral human development aspects, and therefore, happiness. Again, in Zamagni:

The dimensions of the authentic human development are three: material [...], relational [...], spiritual [...]. That's why I prefer to talk about integral human development (Zamagni 2012B, p. 9).

This common good, understood as good of everyone, presupposes the development of each one's responsibility for the fate of others; thus, it is a common task impossible to accomplish in the absence of fraternal sense.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Despite all we have said, we must not fall into the trap of believing that there are direct links between Maritain and the civil tradition authors, neither seems very likely that the French philosopher had read works framed in this tradition. We cannot forget that it remains *sleeping* throughout the nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. This opinion has been confirmed by one of the most important experts on Maritain's thought: Vittorio Possenti. He answered to the question in these terms:

I wouldn't say that Maritain had any cultural link with Genovesi, Rosmini, etc. What we can find is a deep affinity, due to the common personalism.¹⁶

However, the convergence between both approaches can produce a very tight comparison between the aspects analyzed in the work of Maritain and the proposals of the Italian civil tradition. In short, we can say that Maritain offers an anthropological conception widely coincident with the proposals of the Italian civil tradition, which is based on the attention to the human being from a broad and inclusive perspective (which Maritain understood as *personality*), without committing exclusively to the material aspects of human existence (*individuality*). In this way, both of them claim to light as clearly as possible the richness and depth of what it means to be human. In other words, the anthropological conception of both positions allows overcoming the narrow, limited and demeaning view of the *homo economicus*.

5.1. Further developments for the civil economy from its personalists roots

- A first issue for further research should be to deepen in the anthropological distinction *individual - personal*, its speculative potentialities and limitations as explanatory categories of the humanity. More specifically, this distinction must be put in connection with some of the most vigorous current lines of work in sociology (some of which have been mentioned in this work), which point at the recovery of the concept of *person* as a basis to design social institutions. For this purpose, it would be highly desirable to deepen the personalist movement and the contributions that it can make to the Civil Economy and to the current sociological debate.

- It also seems very convenient to advance in the understanding that Maritain makes of the openness to transcendence as a constitutively human dimension as well as the connection of this dimension with different branches of knowledge (economics, business, politics, sociology...).

- Another research focus lit by the Thomist-maritainian matrix points to the idea of recovering the debate on natural law from the most fruitful assumptions that guided Maritain's activity: the possibility of building a common ethical foundation based on purely practical consensus. This approach does not exclude the need of carrying out also its theoretical basis, but can be offered as an alternative enabler of important progress in intercultural dialogue in a globalized world. We believe that further researches should analyze in detail the concept of *secular democratic faith* in Maritain's works.

¹⁶ E-mail sent to us on September 22th 2013.

- The concept of *fraternal friendship* as a basis on which to build the *city* is another approach that we consider appropriate for further researches. We think that it is very convenient to investigate on it in order to design new paradigms of social life in line with the richness and depth of the human personality.

- It would be also desirable to develop researches on the anthropological models emerging from modernity, particularly the *homo economicus* paradigm; the purpose of these researches should show how these models have influenced and limited our understanding of the social sciences (especially in Economics, Politics and Sociology).

5.2. Balance

The capitalist Economy is not working, even the Social Economy. Inequalities are increasing, and current socio-economic systems lead to situations of social injustice and exclusion. We must face an anthropological paradigm change that allows us to design new models of society, economy and market enablers of happiness. In the words of Genovesi, civic friendship is not a capital that is built out of the market and then the market uses, because market is a part of civil society (Genovesi, 2013, p. 341).

We have to rebuild our idea of market to understand it as a felicitating place where we can express our natural relationality; for that purpose, it is essential to recover an anthropological model that brings us back the horizons of human brotherhood, in line with the proposal of the personalistic and civil traditions. As it is suggested by Zamagni,

If market and economic activity lets us to play more qualitative and intrinsic human dimensions as gratuitousness and reciprocity, we can not fear the market. [...] On the contrary, it would become a place of happiness (Zamagni, 2008, p. 183).

Otherwise, if we remain in the orthodox economic perspective, we must admit that the normal activity of the companies must be based on the principle of *exchange of equivalents*: goods and services are delivered in exchange of its market price. But this principle, taken to the extreme, produces highly dehumanizing effects on the market. The liberal-individualist argument is that the market can add individual preferences without any reference to the notion of common good. This argument is weak because it excludes those who have a less economic capacity. As Grant said, *does it mean that, what makes an individual person is his ability to calculate and give his contractual consent?* (Bruni and Zamagni, 2004, p. 20).

For the Italian civil tradition it is urgent to remake our reflection on the role of the person in the economic activity, because the concept of *individual* in which the economics mainstream is based is much more limited than the concept of *person*, and it is incapable to respond to the challenges of the current times. It is necessary, therefore, to *reconsider the anthropological postulates of the economic mainstream discourse* (Zamagni, 2012A). It requires, in short, a new anthropological configuration that allows Economy to abandon the so-called *Walras fiction*, which sets the objective of the economic thought in the relationship between man and nature. It requires giving back to the economy the relational dimension without which it is no longer human and, as a result, becomes unable to serve human development and happiness: *under the light of the concept of relationship, we can rethink the human subject as a person* (Martigniani, 2012, p. 114). *The missing element in the traditional economic theory is the person in relation* (Zamagni, 2006, p. 46); for this reason, we need an economic science who understands that, as Pareyson says, *the man is a relationship; it is not that he is related, or that he has a relationship, but he is a relationship. More precisely: he is a relationship with the being (ontological) and a relationship with the other* (Pareyson, 1995, p. 15).

We consider that, according with Tabarro (2010), we must refund the system not only in an economic or financial sense, but also in a political and cultural sense, according to an idea of *integral development* inspired by a new humanism. Our thesis is that Maritain's anthropology can provide a solid and rich enough foundation as to light a reformulation of the economic science in a new direction: to make it a science that can help the man to develop himself in all the human senses; and, of course, to help him to be happy.

Both Maritain and the Civil Economy tradition consider that the experience of human sociability and brotherhood has to be played within the normal social and economic life, not beside, our before, or

afterwards (Bruni and Zamagni, 2004, p. 18). The prospect raised by Bruni and Zamagni is that the presence of economic agents oriented by the values of the Civil Economy in the normal economic life can change the logic of the *for profit* entities:

We need prophetic minorities who can help society to point at a new direction to move to (Zamagni, 2012A).

That is also the maritainian approach; he refers in *Humanisme Intégral* (1936) to these *agents of change as leaven in the dough*; and in chapter 5 of *The Man and the State* (1952) as *prophets of the people and prophetic minorities*.

The reflection on happiness made by Genovesi and his colleagues is always accompanied by adjectives such as *civil, political, public* or *national*. In a certain way, they are emphasizing that every possibility of happiness is necessarily linked to the community, which is expression of the natural human sociability. As this relational element develops through the practice of civic virtue, it becomes fraternity. And it is just to that ideal, the construction of the *fraternal city*, where the whole philosophical and political maritainian system points at.

The Italian civil tradition, therefore, claims for a decidedly personalistic Economy, at the measure of the person understood integrally, and not just in its material-individual dimension. In the center of his proposal lies the conviction that market can become a meeting place and a privileged context to experience the natural human sociability, the bond that unites us to other human beings and, therefore, a place to generate a new society, not only just and solidary, but over all, fraternal.

In changing times like the current ones (from modern age to post-modernity), the physical and mathematical sciences *have not much to offer. They can give answers, but not ask the right questions, and today the economy needs much of the latter, starting with the question about the man* (Zamagni, 2012A, p. 142). We need Humanities to raise the right questions. Only if we question the economic mainstream it is possible to design new theoretical systems that raises issues of interest to both disciplines; we do not just to juxtapose categories and languages, or subordinate a discipline to the other. Therefore, *we must begin to seek the truth* (Zamagni, 2012A, p. 143).

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